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Abstract This paper focuses on a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects
of discretionary changes of unemployment compensation payments on aggregate
fluctuations. By means of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, it is
shown that unemployment compensation can stabilize consumption on the one
hand; however, on the other one, it has adverse effects on unemployment and
output. These theoretical results are confirmed by the empirical structural vector
autoregressive model. Moreover, the results highlight the importance of real wages
in transmitting unemployment benefit shocks on to the macroeconomy. In partic-
ular, discretionary changes lead to an increase in real wages, unemployment and
consumption while inducing a small decline in output.
Keywords DSGE models  Fiscal policy  Unemployment insurance
JEL Classification E3  E62  J65
1 Introduction
The importance of discretionary changes in government consumption and taxes for
economic fluctuations is well understood, see for instance Galı´, Lo´pez-Salido and
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Valle´s (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2008), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for
empirical evidence and Baxter and King (1993), Chari et al. (1994) and Chari and
Kehoe (1999) for theoretical work. However, the government can affect economic
fluctuations also by other instruments of which an important one is the publicly
provided social insurance program. This program has increasingly attracted the
attention of research. Past research, however, either has put all these sources of
governmental impact into one overall variable to elaborate on the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal policy or has been directed toward estimating program specific
effects on the microeconomic level. So far, the investigation into the macroeco-
nomic effects of specific public social programs has been left untouched.
In the United States, the unemployment insurance program constitutes one of the
major social security systems. It provides payments and income protection for those
who have involuntarily lost their jobs. During normal times, unemployment benefit
payments are provided through the regular unemployment compensation program,
which is administered and funded at the state level. Regular benefit payments occur
on a weekly basis and replace 50–80% of the pre-unemployment earnings. In the
majority of the states, this insurance lasts for 26 weeks. During economic
downturns, however, the federal government often provides additional support by
extending unemployment insurance benefits—both the duration as well as the
replacement rate. The US government has repeatedly made use of this practice in
order to combat the surmounting joblessness. For instance, within the last financial
crisis, unemployed workers who reside in states with relatively high unemployment
rates are entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits up to 99 weeks, that
is, 26 weeks of regular payments and 73 weeks of extended benefits1 (see for
instance Fujita 2010; Whittaker 2008; Whittaker and Isaacs 2011a, b; Whittaker
et al. 2011).
Given the painful nature of job losses, the merits of unemployment compensation
benefits are often taken for granted in public discussions, in particular, because as an
insurance against unemployment, they provide welfare gains to those workers who
lost their jobs. However, the question which arises immediately is: are these gains
produced at a cost since they induce a redistribution of resources away from their
efficient use? Hence, the study of unemployment benefits is important for at least
two reasons. First, they affect not just a single market but several ones immediately;
next to their instantaneous effects along the demand side of the economy by
increasing the income of unemployed people, they also have an impact on the labor
market by crucially affecting the wage bargaining process between workers and
firms. The second argument is related to one common question addressing fiscal
policy, namely to what extent do unemployment benefits act as an accelerator of
economic fluctuations? The government provides an insurance against job loss by
1 In the United States, there are two types of federal emergency programs. One is called the extended
benefit program which is permanently authorized, meaning that the extension is triggered automatically
whenever the state unemployment rate reaches a certain level. It provides additional weeks of
unemployment benefit payments up to a maximum of 13 or even 20 weeks. The second type is a federal
program that the Congress enacts temporarily during economic downturns. The Congress has repeatedly
implemented these federal emergency programs. These programs typically provided benefits for a total of
around 60 weeks.
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means of unemployment compensation payments. There is, however, a concern that
it might produce an adverse effect on the incentive to look for a job. That is,
unemployment insurance could cause job seekers to put less effort into searching for
a job, consequently raising the unemployment rate. Now, if the government
provides additional support by extending unemployment insurance benefits in
economic downturns, then the unemployment insurance system could severely
increase the persistence as well as the level of unemployment. The important thing
to notice is that in the latter case, the government implements discretionary policy:
it carries out expansionary fiscal policy by extending the regular unemployment
compensation program. These discretionary changes are at the core of the current
analysis.
On their own, unemployment benefits have been analyzed in great depth at the
microeconomic level. Studies by Gruber (1997), Hamermesh (1992) and Browning
and Crossley (2001), to mention a few, find that there is strong evidence that
unemployment benefits smooth individual consumption and that the magnitude of
such consumption smoothing is nontrivial. They emphasize the importance of
unemployment insurance provided by the government due to both adverse selection
problems with private unemployment insurance systems and potential capital
market constraints faced by workers who try to smooth their lifetime consumption.
Thus, publicly provided unemployment insurance may raise welfare by filling the
missing market for a state-contingent payment (Gruber 1997). Apart from the
effects of unemployment benefits on individual consumption, research has also
focused on the effects of the duration of unemployment on an individual’s decision
whether to work or rather draw unemployment benefits. Nickell (1979), Lancaster
(1979) and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), to mention a few, found that higher
benefits are associated with longer unemployment spells. However, there is
criticism to this finding since, as Pellizzari (2005) argues, changes in the generosity
of unemployment benefits have no significant effect on the level or duration of
unemployment.
Regarding their macroeconomic influences, Hamermesh (1992), Auerbach
and Feenberg (2000) and Dunson et al. (1991) among others emphasize their
importance as a source of automatic stabilizer. Keynesian macroeconomics argues
that the automatic increase in benefit payments that accompanies cyclical declines
in aggregate demand will at least partly maintain consumer confidence spending
and hence dampen the reduction in aggregate demand. Apart from this stabilizing
effect, Hamermesh (1992) argued that aggregate output might be affected
negatively from unemployment insurance programs since these programs shift
resources away from their efficient use. The argument is that unemployment
insurance programs subsidize risky activities which leads to their relative
expansion. At the margin, resources are diverted from their best uses such that
aggregate output is diminished.
This paper seeks to understand the discretionary effects of changes in
unemployment compensation, both from an empirical and from a theoretical
perspective. The theoretical part is motivated by a standard dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model comprising the New Keynesian and the
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model. The analysis considers unemployment
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benefit payments both from an exogenous definition and from an endogenous one.
The results show that higher unemployment benefit payments affect consumption
positively on the one hand; however, on the other hand, they trigger negative effects
on output and unemployment. These findings are supported by the empirical model.
Specifically, I specify a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model using,
among others, consumption, the real wage, aggregate output and unemployment as
core variables. Based on the identification of a surprise innovation in unemployment
benefits, I trace out the effects on aggregate variables triggered by discretionary
changes in unemployment compensation. The results suggest that after an
expansionary shock unemployment and real wages respond in a hump-shaped
pattern peaking after about one and a half years, output responds in a hump-shaped
pattern too; however, it reaches a trough after about two and a half years. Moreover,
consumption increases and falls back to its preshock value after about three years.
The policy shock accounts for a nontrivial fraction of the variation in unemploy-
ment, real wages and consumption.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates the DSGE model and
discusses the theoretical results. Section 3 presents the empirical part and ends with
a discussion of the nature of the shock. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.
2 The DSGE model
This section motivates the effects of changes in unemployment benefit payments
by means of a small dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The
present model is a standard New Keynesian model augmented with the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Following Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Gertler et al. (2008), I only allow for an
adjustment along the extensive margin in the labor market.
The economy consists of households, a continuum of wholesale firms which
produce differentiated intermediate goods, the retail firms, a fiscal authority and a
central bank in charge of monetary policy.
2.1 The household sector
There is a continuum of agents with mass unity who consume different varieties
of goods and save. Each agent can be either employed or unemployed. Once
employed, the consumer supplies one unit of labor in-elastically and receives labor
income; if not employed, he receives unemployment benefits.
Households maximize the following expected lifetime utility:
Et
P
s t b
s lnðCsÞ
 
; where Ct denotes consumption of final goods and b is the
discount factor. For employed household members (nt), total real labor income net
of labor taxes is given by (1 - s)Wtnt, where Wt denotes the real wage and s is the
labor tax rate. Each unemployed household member (Ut) receives unemployment
benefits Ct: Let Dt be lump sum profits, Bt nominal riskless bonds and Rt the gross
nominal return on bonds, then the budget constraint is:
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PtCt þ R1t Bt ¼ Bt1 þ Pt ð1  sÞWtnt þ CtUt½  þ Dt ð1Þ
Households maximize lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint which
yields the following intertemporal optimality condition: 1 ¼ Et Kt;tþ1 Rtptþ1
h i
; where
Kt;tþs is the stochastic discount factor: Kt;tþs  bs CtþsCt and pt is the gross inflation
rate.
2.2 Matching of vacancies and unemployment
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producing firms indexed by i 2 ½0; 1:
They post vacancies in order to attract unemployed workers and employ workers.
The amount of employed workers is nt ¼
R 1
0
ntðiÞdi and aggregate vacancies are
given by Vt ¼
R 1
0
VtðiÞdi: Each employed worker supplies a fixed amount of hours
worked and unemployed workers search for jobs. The timing assumption is such
that in case an unemployed worker matches with a vacancy, he starts to work
immediately. This implies that the pool of unemployed people searching for a job is
given by the difference between the total labor force which is normalized to unity
and the amount of employed people: Ut = 1 - nt
The function matching unemployed workers and firms with a vacancy is:
mt ¼ Ufmt V1fmt ð2Þ
fm is the elasticity of unemployment in the matching technology and the total
amount of matches in period t is given by mt. Let qt denote the probability of a
vacancy being filled in period t by defining
qt ¼ mt
Vt
¼ Vt
Ut
 fm
¼ #fmt ð3Þ
where #t :¼ VtUt measures the degree of labor market tightness. Similarly, pt is the
probability a searching worker finds a job and is given by: pt ¼ #t  qt
Firms and workers take qt and pt as given. Finally, each period firms separate
from a fraction s of their current workforce nt-1(i). Once a worker loses his job, he is
not allowed to search until the next period. This restriction implies that fluctuations
are triggered by cyclical variations in hiring rather than due to fluctuations in
separations.
2.3 Wholesale firms
Production takes place in the wholesale firms. They hire workers and negotiate
wage contracts with them. Following Ebell and Haefke (2009), I refrain from the
one-worker-one-firm assumption in favor of a more general framework with
multiple worker-firm pairings. The production of a typical wholesale firm depends
on the amount of workers hired. When firms chose employment, they take the real
wage as given. The firm considers the workers as identical and the output produced
in firm i at time t is: yt(i) = nt
A nt(i), where nt
A represents total factor productivity.
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Wholesale firms solve a profit maximization problem based on the following
expected stream of revenues net of expenses: Et
P1
s¼0 Kt;tþs ltðiÞnAt ntþsðiÞ

WtþsntþsðiÞ  cvVtþsðiÞÞ; where Kt;tþ1 is the households’ stochastic discount
factor defined in Sect. 2.12, cv are the costs per vacancy associated with posting
vacancies and Wt is the real wage. The employment flow equation of firm i is given
by: nt(i) = (1 - s)nt-1(i) ? qtVt(i) .
At each point in time, a firm maximizes its profits by choosing the work force and
the amount of vacancies posted. The first-order conditions of the firm’s optimization
problem yield the following job creation condition:
cv
qt
¼ Et Kt;tþ1 nAtþ1ltþ1ðiÞ  Wtþ1ðiÞ þ ð1  sÞ
cv
qtþ1
  
ð4Þ
Equation 4 equates the expected return of creating a new job, expressed by the
right hand side, to the cost of vacancy creation. The cost of creating a vacancy is
given by the expected duration it takes to fill a vacancy (1/qt) times the associated
costs per vacancy (cv).
2.4 Wage bargaining
The matching friction gives rise to a bilateral monopoly context. There are rents to
be split when workers and wholesale firms meet: if one party turns down a wage
offer, finding another potential partner is costly. I proceed by following Pissarides
(2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Ebell and Haefke (2009) by applying
the Nash bargaining solution. In this framework, the bargained real wage (Wt) is
determined as the outcome of a Nash bargaining between workers and firms.
Each household member can be either employed or unemployed. Agent is value
function of these two states satisfies
YEt ðiÞ ¼ ð1  sÞWt þ Et Kt;tþ1 ð1  sÞYEtþ1ðiÞ þ sYUtþ1ðiÞ
 	  ð5Þ
YUt ðiÞ ¼ Ct þ Et Kt;tþ1 ptþ1YEtþ1ðiÞ þ ð1  ptþ1ÞYUtþ1ðiÞ
 	  ð6Þ
where Yt
E and Yt
U represent the value of employment and unemployment. The value
of unemployment depends on the current flow value Ct and the likelihood of being
employed versus unemployed in the next period. Ct will be discussed in more detail
in Sect. 2.6
The value function of firm i is: JtðiÞ ¼ nAt ltðiÞ  Wt þ ð1  sÞEt Kt;tþ1Jtþ1ðiÞ
 
and the free entry condition implies that cvqt ¼ Et Kt;tþ1Jtþ1ðiÞ
 
: Bargaining takes
place over the real wage (Wt) and the aggregate price level (Pt) is taken as given.
The equilibrium real wage is derived from the maximization of the following Nash
product: maxW Y
EðiÞ  YUðiÞð Þ1gJðiÞg; where g 2 ð0; 1Þ measures the bargaining
power of each party. The first-order condition implies the following expression for
the real wage
2 Since households are the owners of firms, profits are evaluated in terms of value attached to them.
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Wt ¼ 1  g
1  s Ct þ g n
A
t lt þ cv#t
 	 ð7Þ
The result is intuitive: the real wage a worker gets is increasing in unemployment
benefits (Ct), the relative bargaining strength of the worker (1 - g), the tightness in
the labor market and the tax rate on labor income.
2.5 Retailers
Retailers are monopolistic competitors and set prices for their goods to be sold in
the product market in a staggered fashion. They buy the intermediate goods from the
wholesale firms and differentiate them with a technology that transforms one unit of
intermediate good into one unit of retail good and then re-sell these transformed
goods to households as consumption goods.
The final good is produced by a representative firm using a CES production
function with elasticity of substitution  to aggregate a continuum of intermediate
goods indexed by Yt ¼ ð
R 1
0
ytðiÞ
1
 diÞ 1: Final goods producers operate in compet-
itive markets and maximize each period the following stream of profits PtYt 
R 1
0
ptðiÞytðiÞdi where pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i. The demand for each
intermediate input good is ytðiÞ ¼ ðptðiÞ=PtÞ  Yt and the aggregate price level
satisfies Pt ¼ ð
R 1
0
ptðiÞ1diÞ
1
1:
I assume that Calvo-type price staggering (Calvo 1983) applies to the price
setting behavior of retailers. The probability that a firm cannot re-optimize its price
for k periods is given by hk. Profit maximization by a retailer who is allowed to re-
optimize his price at time t chooses a target price pt
* to maximize the following
stream of future profits: maxpt Et
P1
k¼0 h
kKt;tþk
pt
Ptþk
 ytþkjtðiÞ  Cotþk ytþkjtðiÞ
 	
 h i
for which the first-order condition is
Et
X1
k¼0
hkKt;tþkytþkjtðiÞ p

t
Ptþk
 
 1 ltþkjtðrÞ
 " #
¼ 0 ð8Þ
where Co0tþkjtðYtþkjtðrÞÞ ¼ ltþkjtðrÞ are marginal costs.
2.6 Fiscal and monetary policy
Monetary policy is modeled by a simple Taylor type rule of the following form:
Rt
R ¼ p/pt ; where R is the steady-state value of Rt. The fiscal authority’s budget
constraint satisfies
sWtNt þ R1t Bt ¼
Bt1
pt
þ UtCt ð9Þ
where real government bonds satisfy Bt ¼ Bt=Pt:Ct is the amount of unemploy-
ment benefits given to an unemployed worker as outlined in Sects. 2.1 and 2.4.
Hence, the total amount of expenditures due to unemployment benefit payments is
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UtCt: In the present model, the fiscal authority controls unemployment benefits by
making use of the following fiscal policy rule (expressed in log-deviations from the
corresponding steady states)
C^t ¼ /CC^t1 þ ð1  /CÞ/UU^t þ Ct where Ct ð0; r2CÞ ð10Þ
It is assumed that /C 2 ½0; 1Þ: The baseline model is characterized by letting
unemployment benefits enter the model as a complete exogenous variable following
a persistent AR(1) process (/U = 0). With /U [ 0, one can allow for a feedback
from the economy to unemployment compensation. In particular, this scenario is
supposed to represent the policy steps taken by the US government as mentioned in
the introduction. The extension of unemployment benefit payments in times of
economic downturns is replicated in the model by /U [ 0. Hence, unemployment
benefit payments become more generous when unemployment is high.
2.7 Calibration
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The discount factor b is set to 0.99.
The matching elasticity parameter fM is fixed at 0.5 which is in line with empirical
evidence surveyed in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The bargaining weight for
workers 1 - g is set to 0.5, and following Fujita and Ramey (2007), the steady-state
unemployment rate is equal to 0.08. In line with den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000) and Willems (2010), I fix the steady-state firm matching rate q at 0.7 and the
steady-state job finding rate at 0.6. This defines the steady-state labor market
tightness parameter 0 at 0.85 and the job destruction rate s at 0.05. The value for the
parameter describing costs due to vacancy posting cv is obtained via the job creation
condition and equals 0.097.
The coefficient for inflation in the Taylor rule is set to 1.5. Following the RBC
literature, the autocorrelation coefficient of the AR(1) process for technology (qA) is
set to 0.90 and the one for unemployment benefits (/C) to 0.80
3.
2.8 Model dynamics
The current section discusses unemployment benefits from two perspectives: Fig. 1
elaborates on the discretionary effects of changes in unemployment benefit
payments, whereas Fig. 2 shows the consequences of endogenous unemployment
benefits based on a technology shock.
In Fig. 1, the black solid line represents the baseline scenario where unemploy-
ment benefits (Ct) follow an exogenous AR(1) process (/U = 0). The immediate
effect of an increase in unemployment benefits is a strong increase in the real wage.
The intensity of the impact mainly depends on the relative strength of each party,
that is firms and workers, within the wage negotiations. As a consequence of higher
unemployment benefits, workers demand higher wages so as to still be eligible for
3 Estimating an AR(1) process for the time series of unemployment benefits, as discussed in Sect. 3,
would yield a value of 0.794 for the autocorrelation coefficient.
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work. The higher the workers’ share within these negotiations, the stronger is the
effect of an increase in unemployment compensation on the real wage.
The increase in the real wage triggers a series of effects, in particular within the
production sector which the job creation condition is crucial for. An increase in the
real wage decreases the expected return of creating new jobs, that is the willingness
of posting vacancies shrinks. Hence, the amount of posted vacancies declines.
Moreover, the shadow value of employment falls since now firms face higher costs
due to a higher wage bill. As a consequence, aggregate employment declines,
and since the total amount of people available for work is constant, the decrease in
employment propagates into higher unemployment.
Moving on to the goods market, the strong decline in employment is transmitted
into a corresponding drop in aggregate output. This is in line with Hamermesh
(1992) who argues that aggregate output might be affected negatively due to
increases in unemployment benefits since these programs shift resources away
from their efficient use. However, usually these programs are not aimed at stabi-
lizing output but consumption instead. As shown in Fig. 1, consumption increases
strongly. The reason for the increase is due to the fact that the real interest rate
declines. The fall in marginal costs triggers a decline in the inflation rate. By the
Taylor principle, the decline in the inflation rate causes an even stronger fall in
the nominal rate, hence inducing real rates to fall. The lower real rates boost
Fig. 1 Impulse response functions to a shock in unemployment benefits. In the baseline scenario,
unemployment benefits follow an exogenous AR(1) process (/U = 0). The dotted line represents a
scenario where unemployment benefits react endogenously to unemployment (/U = 0.5)
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consumption. In order to understand the decline in marginal costs despite the
increase in real wages, the job creation condition (Eq. 4) is once more of
importance. The fall in the shadow value of employment triggers a decline in
employment as well as the number of vacancies posted. This decrease outweighs the
increase in real wages so that finally marginal costs decline.
Comparing this to the scenario where unemployment benefits react endogenously
to changes in unemployment (shown by the dotted line in Fig. 1) indicates that the
results do not change qualitatively. However, what changes is the persistence of the
shock. This is due to a multiplier effect which will be explained below.
In contrast to Figs. 1 and 2 shows the consequences of a contractionary
technology shock once unemployment benefit payments react endogenously to
higher unemployment rates (shown by the dotted lines). The policy is such that
higher unemployment increases unemployment benefit payments. This policy
specification is in line with the second type of federal programs in the United States
as discussed in the introduction.
The contractionary technology shock triggers a fall in output, employment, real
wages and consumption. The figure compares the baseline calibration (exogenous
unemployment benefits) to the extended one with /U = 0.5. The paths of the
impulse response functions do not change qualitatively. However, quantitatively,
there are severe differences compared to the baseline model.
Fig. 2 Impulse response functions to a shock in technology. In the baseline scenario, unemployment
benefits follow an exogenous AR(1) process (/U = 0). The dotted line represents a scenario where
unemployment benefits react endogenously to unemployment (/U = 0.5)
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The reason for this change is due to a strong multiplier effect that emerges
because of the endogeneity of unemployment compensation. The contractionary
technology shock increases unemployment initially. Now, a recurrent feedback
pattern occurs such that higher unemployment rates increase unemployment benefit
payments. These on the other hand put upward pressure on the real wage which
again increases unemployment. This feedback pattern strongly increases the inertia
of the model.
The endogenous feedback between unemployment benefit payments and
unemployment leads to a stronger fall in all variables except consumption. Higher
unemployment compensation attenuates the fall in consumption. This is in line with
the results of Fig. 1 which emphasize the positive effects of higher unemployment
compensation on consumption.
3 Structural VAR analysis
This section addresses the empirical part. In particular, a structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) model is estimated and used to judge the macroeconomic
effects of changes in unemployment benefit payments. The section starts by
describing how to estimate a shock to unemployment benefit payments. I then report
estimates of how major variables respond to the shock. Finally, I discuss the fraction
of the variance in these variables that is accounted for by this shock.
The starting point is the characterization of the policy for unemployment
benefits:
Ct ¼ Etf ðXtþsÞ þ Ct ; for some s 2 Z and Ct WNð0; r2CÞ ð11Þ
Here, Ct represents unemployment benefit payments, f is a linear function, Xt is
an information set and Ct is an exogenous shock. The basic identifying assumption
is that Ct is orthogonal to the elements in Xt: Let yt denote the vector of variables
included in the analysis. I partition yt as follows:
yt ¼ y01;t;Ct
h i0
The vector y1,t consists of variables whose values at time t are contained in Xt
and that are assumed not to respond to the shock contemporaneously. The variables
in y1,t are real gross domestic product, real consumption, real wages and
unemployment. I measure unemployment benefits Ct by the replacement rate as
composed by the OECD (Martin 1996). The data sources as well as details on the
replacement rate are in the ‘‘Appendix’’. With the exception of the replacement rate,
all variables are in logarithmic terms.
The ordering of the variables in y1,t entails two important identifying
assumptions. First, the time t information set of the fiscal authority in charge of
Ct consists of current and lagged values of the variables in y1,t. Second, the variables
in y1,t do not respond contemporaneously to the unemployment benefits shock 
C
t .
The SVAR contains a constant term and four lags of each variable and the sample
period is: 1971:Q1-2010:Q1. Consider the following SVAR:
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ðI  UðLÞÞyt ¼ uþ Wt ð12Þ
where W is a 5 9 5 lower triangular matrix with diagonal terms equal to unity and
t is a vector of mean-zero serially uncorrelated shocks with a diagonal variance-
covariance matrix. I estimate the parameters UðLÞ;u;W and the variances of the
elements in t using standard least-squares techniques.
3.1 The consequences of shocks to unemployment compensation
The impulse response functions of all variables are shown in Fig. 3. The solid black
lines correspond to the point estimates for the dynamic multipliers. The shaded
areas indicate confidence intervals4. Since the impulse response functions only show
the adjustment paths of the variables, it is natural to ask how large the portion is that
is caused by the shock to unemployment compensation. With this question in mind,
Table 1 reports results for forecast error variance decompositions. In particular,
it shows the percentage of the variance of the k-step-ahead forecast error in the
elements of yt due to the exogenous shock for various horizons. The numbers in
parentheses are the associated standard errors. The results suggest that after an
expansionary shock to the replacement rate,
1. unemployment and real wages respond in a hump-shaped pattern peaking after
about one and a half years and return slowly back to their preshock levels;
2. output responds in a hump-shaped pattern reaching a trough after about two and
a half years;
3. consumption increases and falls back to its preshock value after about three
years;
4. the policy shocks account for a nontrivial fraction of the variation in
unemployment, real wages and consumption.
These results are qualitatively in line with those of the DSGE model discussed in
Sect. 2.8 and shown in Fig. 1. Regarding the reaction of consumption to a surprise
innovation in unemployment benefits, an important question addresses the issue of
its strong increase. On the one hand, the increase in consumption can be due to the
fact that the additional consumption expenditures of unemployed people put upward
pressure on aggregate consumption. On the other hand, it can be due to the fact that
higher unemployment benefits paid lead to an increase in the real wage within the
wage negotiations such that finally aggregate consumption rises due to higher
wages. Which of these two effects dominates? In order to answer this question,
I re-run the previously estimated SVAR model, but this time without the real wage.
To the extent that the previous results highlighted the importance of the real wage in
transmitting the shock in unemployment benefits, the impulse response functions in
a system without the real wage give a hint regarding the relative importance of the
real wage in triggering reactions in aggregate consumption. The results in a SVAR
system without the real wage highlight that there is no variable which is affected
4 I use the method described in Sims and Zha (1999).
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significantly. Moreover, the impulse response functions are partly even opposite to
the ones shown in Fig. 3. These results highlight the importance of the real wage in
transmitting shocks to unemployment compensation. Additionally, they indicate
that the reason for the increase in aggregate consumption is not due to the
contribution of the unemployed people who now have more cash available, but it is
crucially related to the corresponding increase in the market wage due to the fact
that increases in unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages.
Fig. 3 Impulse response functions to a shock in the replacement rate
Table 1 Forecast error variance decomposition
4 Quarters 8 Quarters 32 Quarters
Ahead Ahead Ahead
Output 0.59 (0.10) 1.03 (0.21) 0.92 (3.93)
Consumption 7.25 (2.12) 7.63 (2.41) 9.01 (1.89)
Unemployment 21.37 (5.31) 12.51 (3.11) 3.01 (0.19)
Real wage 16.19 (5.31) 15.61 (4.15) 4.16 (2.04)
Unemployment compensation 54.60 (13.40) 62.22 (19.54) 82.30 (27.43)
Standard errors are in parentheses
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As far as the transmission of the shock to unemployment benefit payments is
concerned, Table 2 provides some further insights by showing results for Granger
causality tests.
The coefficients in the VAR of unemployment benefits are all together, that is,
for all lags considered, insignificant in the equation of any variable, except in the
one of the real wage. This implies that unemployment benefits only Granger cause
the real wage. Hence, the previously identified shock is a fiscal policy shock which
primarily matters for the labor market since its information only helps predicting the
real wage.
In this sense, the real wage is crucial in determining the pass through of
unemployment benefit shocks. To the extent that it is the only variable which is
Granger caused by unemployment benefits, the further propagation of this shock
depends on the effects of the real wage on the other variables. As Table 2 again
shows, the real wage Granger causes consumption and unemployment. Once this set
of variables is affected, the surprise innovation in unemployment benefits spreads
out to the remaining one: aggregate output.
Table 2 Granger causality test
The null hypothesis is that the
coefficients of the specific
variable considered are zero.
The corresponding p value for
this test is given here
Equation Variable p Value
Consumption Unemployment 0.71
Output 0.79
Real wage 0.03
Unemployment benefits 0.84
All 0.00
Unemployment Consumption 0.02
Output 0.01
Real wage 0.00
Unemployment benefits 0.89
All 0.00
Output Consumption 0.00
Unemployment 0.32
Real wage 0.57
Unemployment benefits 0.92
All 0.00
Real wage Consumption 0.09
Unemployment 0.47
Output 0.04
Unemployment benefits 0.00
All 0.00
Unemployment benefits Consumption 0.43
Unemployment 0.05
Output 0.95
Real wage 0.00
All 0.00
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An important point to emphasize here is that despite the fact that unemployment
benefits do not Granger cause labor market fluctuations along the extensive margin
directly, they do cause changes in unemployment as the shock spreads out in the
course of the propagation. Hence, changes in unemployment benefits as such do not
directly induce changes in unemployment but only to the extent that the real wage is
affected. However, once unemployment is affected by these shocks, there is a
feedback. As Table 2 displays, unemployment benefits are Granger caused by
unemployment and the real wage. Therefore, a VAR system having unemployment
benefits entering as an exogenous variable would constitute a severe misspecifi-
cation since it neglects its endogeneity. This of course raises a further question:
How can we think of the shock identified by the SAVR?
3.2 What does the shock represent?
In general, the equation for unemployment benefits in the SVAR model can be
interpreted as a reaction function in surprises of the fiscal authority. Considering the
SVAR model given by Eq. 12, it becomes apparent that the equation for
unemployment benefits models unemployment compensation as a function of all
structural shocks in the SVAR and not just as a function of its own stochastic
component. This is due to the endogeneity of unemployment benefits as already
discussed by means of Granger causality tests. However, the SVAR analysis allows
us to separate these stochastic structural components from each other so that we can
finally analyze those elements in unemployment compensation which are uniquely
due to the policy reaction function as described by Eq. 11 and separated from all
other sources.
Regarding the identifying restrictions, SVAR models first decompose all
endogenous variables into their expected and unexpected components. The
identification procedure utilized in the current SVAR model imposes identifying
restrictions only on the unexpected parts. These restrictions guarantee that the
structural shocks are orthogonal to each other. Hence, given that a fiscal policy
reaction function as specified by Eq. 11 is an appropriate reflection of reality, it is
exactly this expression which tells us the possible sources of the policy shocks.
To this extent, there are three realistic sources: (a) changes in the relative weights
defined by the fiscal authority when reacting to fluctuations in wages, unemploy-
ment, etc., (b) imperfect information on the part of the fiscal authority about the
current or future economic stance and (c) changes in the fiscal policy stance
unrelated to the current or future economic conditions as well as unrelated to the
prevailing policy reaction function.
The first source of fiscal policy shocks refers to the decision-making process
within the fiscal authority. Different fiscal policy positions on how to set
unemployment benefits are likely described by different preferences concerning
the relative weights determining the reaction of unemployment benefits to
fluctuations in wages, unemployment, etc. Moreover, as already discussed
previously, in the United States, there are two types of federal emergency
programs. One is called the extended benefit program which is permanently
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authorized, meaning that the extension is triggered automatically whenever the state
unemployment rate reaches a certain level. In this case, additional unemployment
benefit payments are offered. The second type is a federal program that the
Congress enacts temporarily during economic downturns. The Congress has
repeatedly implemented these federal emergency programs. These programs
typically provided benefits for a total of around 60 weeks. Their introduction as
well as the duration of the implementation varies, however. As a result, the
decision-making process itself can be random. In this case, the random component
in the fiscal policy reaction function corresponds to random fluctuations in the
preferences of the fiscal authority.
The second source of fiscal policy shocks refers to measurement errors caused by
lags in the collection of the data of those variables which are essential within the
fiscal authority’s decision-making process. The fiscal authority can observe the
actual economic stance and reverse policy actions due to measurement errors only
after the final data have become available. Hence, with a fiscal reaction function
based on revised data due to previous misperceptions of the economic stance, all
previous policy actions show up in the SVAR model as deviations from the rule,
which can then be interpreted as unexpected fiscal policy shocks5.
3.3 Robustness
Since a number of papers have documented the steady decline in the volatility of
output, interest rates, inflation and several other macroeconomic variables for
industrialized countries since the mid-1980s (see for instance McConnell and Perez
Quiroz 2001), it might be possible that the responses of certain variables due to
shocks differ severely in terms of their quantitative pattern across different periods.
In order to focus on this problem, I estimate the same VAR for different decades
to check how sensitive the results are for specific time periods. The results of this
extension highlight that despite the rather small sample size, the findings do not
change qualitatively. As regards quantitative changes, the responses of the variables
to unemployment benefit shocks trigger more pronounced fluctuations in the
seventies and eighties while smaller ones in the following two decades.
The SVAR specification outlined in Sect. 3 has allowed for enough lags such that
the reduced form residuals are clearly white noise processes. However, it is still
possible that omitted variables matter for the results, since, as Francis and Ramey
(2002) and Evans (1992) highlight, structural shocks might be Granger caused by
other variables, among them policy variables, which impedes the interpretation of
them. To check whether the identified shock is correlated with other variables, I
have correlated the estimated structural disturbance with variables that a large class
of general equilibrium models suggests as being jointly generated by the shock.
5 Even though these sources of shocks to policy are not intrinsically important as well as the shocks as
such, the emphasize on the VAR-based approach on policy innovations arises because tracing out the
dynamic adjustment paths of aggregate variables to surprise fiscal policy shocks provides a possibility of
exploring the consequences of a change in the fiscal authority’s stance under minimal identifying
restrictions. Moreover, the analysis of structural innovations performed in SVAR models is the closest
approximation of a controlled experiment available in macroeconometrics (Gottschalk 2001).
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Specifically, I compute correlations up to six leads and lags between the shock and
the labor force participation rate, the real price of investment goods, the slope of the
yield curve, the government expenditures to output ratio, the inflation rate (based on
the CPI) and the oil price. In case some of these variables are trending, I adequately
de-trend them. It turns out that none of the omitted variables significantly correlates
with the identified structural shock.
Finally, since the identification of the structural shock is based on a recursive
ordering of the variables in the SVAR, a different ordering might lead to different
conclusions. In order to account for this, I allow for different contemporaneous
effects of unemployment benefits on real gross domestic product, real consumption,
real wages and unemployment. As it turns out, the results do not change
qualitatively, even quantitatively, the alterations are negligible.
4 Conclusion
The previous analysis provides empirical and theoretical evidence for the
fluctuations triggered by surprise innovations in unemployment benefits.
Using a standard New Keynesian model augmented with the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides model, the theoretical results highlight the importance of the
labor market for the propagation of the shock in unemployment benefits. Higher
unemployment benefit payments put upward pressure on the real wage which
decreases the expected return of creating new jobs. Hence, aggregate employment and
the amount of vacancies posted decline. As a result of the decline in employment,
output decreases too; however, in contrast to this, aggregate consumption strongly
increases. The reason for the increase in aggregate consumption is due to the lower
real rate of interest.
Using a structural VAR model, the empirical results stress that this nonstandard
fiscal policy shock primarily matters for the labor market. In particular, the
identified shock affects the bargaining outcome between workers and firms and
hence strongly affects the real wage. Moreover, the SVAR results highlight that due
to unemployment compensation programs, resources are shifted away from their
efficient use so that finally aggregate output is affected negatively. The fall is
nonnegligible, however, only of rather short duration.
So far, explaining labor market fluctuations solely by macroeconomic shocks is
certainly not the whole story. There are large differences in unemployment across
regions, which are difficult to account for in terms of shocks hitting the whole
economy uniformly rather than heterogeneously. What these findings are useful for
is to figure out how macroeconomic shocks account for the common movements in
unemployment and other key macroeconomic variables, but they cannot explain
why different regions react so differently to aggregate shocks and why specific
groups in the labor force are affected by unemployment more than others. These
varieties can only be explained by focusing on individual characteristics as well as
institutions governing the labor market.
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Appendix 1: Data
The data being used are quarterly U.S. data over the period 1971Q1:2010Q1. The
series were drawn from the OECD database and from the U.S. Department of Labor
(consider Table 3 for the details). These include the unemployment level (survey-
based) (Ut), real hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector (Wt), Gross Domestic
Product at constant prices (Yt), private final consumption expenditures at constant
prices (Ct) and the unemployment replacement rate. All variables entering the VAR
are expressed in logarithmic terms except for the replacement rate. The data vector
in the VAR are defined as follows
yt ¼ logðYtÞ; logðCtÞ; . . .½
. . . logðUtÞ; logðWtÞ;Ct0
ð13Þ
There is one important point to be mentioned regarding the time series for gross
replacement rates: As noted in Martin (1996), the OECD estimates of gross
replacement rates are not available on a quarterly basis. Hence, in order to
equilibrate the time-series frequency of the replacement rate to a quarterly basis,
I apply the method of Chow and Lin (1971) in order to temporally disaggregate the
replacement rate.
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